The largest and most serious question which can be asked today is, how much farther is the militarism of the civilized world to go? . . . Are China and Japan to climb to the war-levelperhaps it would be more true to say descend to the war-level -of England,
Introduction
The attitude of Japan towards and its involvement in the Hague Peace Conferences, 1899 and 1907, has not been given much attention.
By contrasting it with the well-known position Germany took at The Hague, it is hoped that new insights into some of the patterns and potentials of the events may be obtained. Both Germany and Japan were 'latecomers' in the community of nations. The comparison shows that Germany was against the idea almost from the start, while Japan was not -though it required and demanded unanimity among the great powers, to obtain a reduction of armaments and binding guarantees. This seems to indicate that Japan could conceive of the possibility of achieving progress and realizing its national interests without resort to war, 1 whereas Germany thought this was impossible. However, while Germany was part of the European legal tradition, this was not so in the case of Japan. It is therefore necessary, to obtain a better understanding, to take a look at Japanese tradition. 2
The Historical and Legal Background
Ronald P. Toby was the first Western author who in 1984 gave evidence that Japan during the so-called 'seclusion' (sakoku) 'was not nearly so isolated as it has hitherto been portrayed' (Toby, 1984: 21) , 3 an important fact explaining the country's sudden emergence as a modern state. Both politically and economically during the Edo Period (1603-1868), Japan continued to be an accountable partner in the strategic East Asian environment. The diplomatic and trade relations, 4 strictly regulated by the government, constituted a farreaching information network. 5 It is not surprising, therefore, that the significance of international law and its applicability for Japan was discussed and given careful consideration during the first two decades after the 'opening' (kaikoku) of the country to the West in 1854. While the American consul Townsend Harris, who had arrived in Shimoda in 1856, still found Japan 'undemocratic' and 'uncivilized', making it his 'personal mission' to 'bring the heathen country under the laws of nations' (Miyoshi, 1979: 16) , 6 the Japanese carefully studied international law from three aspects. The first was as a 'Way of the State as Moral-Being', then as a 'Shield of the Weak' (relating to the 'Heaven-Bestowed Rights of Man', tempu jinken) and last as a 'Tool of the Strong'. 7 Though 'determined to copy' the West where it seemed appropriate, they by no means wanted to 'become subject' to the Western powers. 8 However, the tariff treaty of 1866 and indemnities 'imposed by foreigners at the point of their naval cannon sent money flowing out of Japan'. As a consequence, 'the West grew richer, [while] Japanese grew money-poor' (LaFeber, 1997: 35) . 9 In March 1868, Japan officially declared that it would conduct its foreign affairs in accordance with public international law (bankoku kôhô). 10 Understanding and adopting bankoku kôhô was facilitated by traditional Confucian conceptions on the conduct of states. At the same time, however, considerations of statecraft made conscription necessary. 11 In the 1860s and 1870s, journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003 386 6 Yanaga (1956: 365) paints Harris in more favourable tones: 'Harris . . . was strongly opposed to extraterritoriality', and 'made every effort to help the Japanese to get rid of the unequal treaties'. 7 For details of the discussion, see Stern (1979) . 8 Japan 'intended to join the Westerners, not invite them in', and pointed to other Asian countries, and also 'to the fate of the American Indians . . . [who] were an early victim of Western imperialism' (LaFeber, 1997: 46, 36) . 9 In this light, obviously, '[o] verseas successes could ease domestic distresses' (LaFeber, 1997: 42) . 10 On 17 February in the first year of Meiji, or 17 March in the Gregorian Calendar, in a public notice, Japan committed itself to this effect (Nihon Gaikô, 1969: 33-34) . 11 Imperial edict concerning the introduction of compulsory military service (28 November 1872). Text in Tsunoda, DeBary & Keene (1964: 197-198 ). Here Japan merely followed the general trend, as Strachan (1988: 49-50 ) so aptly put it: 'Thus the moral power of the state reached its greatest possible extent: in exchange for guaranteeing the natural rights of man, the state could demand the willingness to accept discipline, danger and ultimately death in its defence. What transformed warfare was therefore a revolution in the power of the state, acting in the name of the general will. Military service, from having been the lot of a small section of society, could now in theory be truly universal. ' several diplomatic missions, including the famous Iwakura Mission (Iwakura kengai shisetsu, 1871-73) were sent to the capitals of the foreign powers in Europe and America, largely to effect a revision of the 'unequal treaties'. 12 The failure of the Iwakura Mission 13 to achieve treaty revision decided the Japanese 'change of heart', with regard to the previously held hope to obtain guarantees for Japan's development, national security and independence on the basis of recognized principles of international law -a change which can clearly be seen in the volte-face of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835 Yukichi ( -1901 with regard to this particular question (Fukuzawa, 1958-64 To put it plainly, there are two Ways: to kill, or to be killed . . . this is the Way of every man. However, the Way of foreign intercourse does not differ in the slightest from this principle. 'Treaties of Friendship and Commerce' and the 'Law of Nations' (bankoku kôhô) are very beautiful phrases indeed, but they are merely polite veneer. The true principles of foreign intercourse are nothing more than to fight for power and to forage for profit. (quoted in Stern, 1979: 136) Of course Fukuzawa was not a Darwinist, but he clearly realized the necessity of a strong Japan to defend its interests. 16 This should be kept in mind to understand Japan's position at The Hague. For the work to be accomplished at The Hague, under favourable conditions, a strong Japan would be an asset. In this sense, it was a welcome development that in 'little more than thirty years, between 1868 and 1900, the Japanese [had] built both a nation and an empire' (LaFeber, 1997: 32) .
Japanese participation in the first Hague Peace Conference had been preceded by the country joining a number of international unions, such as the International Telegraphic Union in 1865, the Postal Union (Bern Convention) in 1877, and in 1886 the 'Bern Agreement for the Protection of Works of Literature and Art' and the 'International Red Cross', etc. The German Alexander von Siebold 17 saw Japan 'entering the European diplomatic concert . . . (as it were) through the backdoor' (Siebold, 1900: 8) .
Tokyo's Imperial University (Tôkyô Teikoku-Daigaku), Siebold reports, in the 1880s had a well-equipped Law Faculty. Clearly, Japan wanted to be recognized as a legal person under the Law of Nations in the
12 On the history of the 'unequal treaties', see Jones (1931) . 13 Named after Iwakura Tomomi (1825-83), a court noble who led the 48-member mission. 14 See Miyoshi (1979: 171) ; further discussion in Stern (1979 : 63-100), Miwa (1968 . While Fukuzawa, the great 'publicist of modernization', still in 1872 in his book Gakumon (Learning) had 'defended the theory of tempu jinken' (Heaven-Bestowed Rights of Man), his 1875 treatise Bunmeiron no gairyaku (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization) portrayed the law of nations as 'a Machiavellian tool (kembô jussû)' (Stern, 1979: 135) . 15 According to Miwa (1968: 2) Siebold (1846 Siebold ( -1911 was the son of Philip Franz von Siebold (1796 Siebold ( -1866 , the famous Japanologist who had lived and worked in Japan during the 'seclusion' period.
sense of the ius gentium, obtain 'titles' and access to common goods and benefits under public international law, and fully participate in the community of nations. Yet, a 'basic and universal ingredient in the Japanese attitude to international relations' was, since China's defeat in the 1842 Opium War, 'the fear of . . . conquest of the Far East' by the Western nations 'as a group of "outside countries" (gaikoku), or as individual nations competing among themselves', carrying their wars to Asia (Miwa, 1968: 2) . The first test for Japan to stand up for its own came in 1894 when, following the supposed Chinese intervention in Korea 18 to squash the Tonghak Rebellion, 19 Japan declared war, officially 'in order to secure the independence of Corea', unofficially to obtain a 'strategic foothold on the continent' Clyde (1958: 306) . In this it heeded the advice of its Prussian 'military mentors', i.e. that Korea was 'the touchstone of Japan's security'. 20 When it came, 'Japan's military, along with civilian officials,' welcomed the Sino-Japanese war as 'a club to beat down political unrest, even rioting, arising from economic problems ' (LaFeber, 1997: 47, 48) . 21 From the resulting struggle Japan emerged victorious. This earned it considerable respect from the Western powers, though following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia and France, spearheaded by Germany, intervened taking away its spoils on the mainland. 22 If Japan was 'driven toward imperialism by different impulses', this Triple Intervention served only to confirm its 'well-justified fears that Westerners were creeping uncomfortably close to the home islands, and that these outsiders intended to dominate Japanese trade ' (LaFeber, 1997: 41) . 23
The Idea of the Conference
The modern concept of a peaceful organization of the nations and societies into a legally responsible community developed mainly in 19th-century Europe, but the basic impulse journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003 388 18 Japan had 'opened' Korea in 1876. Subsequent imports of rice to Japan brought profit to few people, while the masses of Korean farmers were left poorer. 19 China, by insisting that Korea was a 'tributary state', apparently violated the Treaty of Tientsin (18 April 1885), which guaranteed 'a position of equality' to both countries, especially in military matters. The Chinese, by sending troops into Korea in June 1894 against the uprising, provided the opportunity for the Japanese to do the same. When they rejected the Japanese proposal for a 'joint SinoJapanese action to effect financial, administrative, and military reforms', the Japanese forced the Korean king to order the expulsion of the Chinese (Clyde, 1958: 297-300) . LaFeber (1997: 48) has it that the 'rioters (an outlawed group, the Tonghaks) were quickly smashed by Korean forces without China's help'. 20 Fukuzawa had argued: 'was there any (countr[y] touched by the Westerners [that was]) able to maintain real independence? . . . We want our learning independent, not licking up the lees and scum of the Westerner. We want our commerce independent, not dominated by them. . . . And that led him back to Asia, for once Japan renewed itself, it could find its mission in revitalizing and exploiting nearby areas -above all, Korea ' (LaFeber, 1997: 37) . 21 'War offered too much -peace at home, secure markets and strategic points in Korea, checkmating a Russian movement south, and membership in the imperialists' club' (LaFeber, 1997: 49 23 Concerning Japanese expansionism in the late 19th and 20th century, it is evident that the Japanese had to pay close attention to the requirements and agreements stipulated by international law. However, they considered that (a) they had the same right as the Europeans to develop backward areas on the Asian mainland economically, and support indigenous reform movements as in China, Korea, etc. -an argument that carried even more weight, as the mainland was in Japan's immediate proximity; (b) admittedly, as in European countries, colonial clubs came into existence, propagating the idea of Japan as a colonial, civilizing power equal to the Western powers (including the USA); and (c) Japan's growing industry was dependent on markets and resources outside Japan. This attitude and policy corresponded to the demand at home that Japan be given a responsible place in the world. As in Asia, the 'Americans wanted markets . . . Japanese wanted markets and security ' (LaFeber, 1997: 74, emphasis added ' (ken'ai) and equality were studied in Japan, too. Universalist ideals were also fostered by Orientalist discoveries of Indian literature, culture and philosophy (Schlichtmann, 2001) .
The Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) brought all these trends to fruition. 25 The neo-Kantian Walther Schücking, eminent professor of international law and a pacifist, believed that the Hague conferences started 'a process . . . which one could characterize as international law (Völkerrecht) being transformed into World Law' (Schücking, 1918: 73; see Schlichtmann, 2002) . By a curious feat of providence, it was the young Russian Tsar Nicholas II who approached the foreign representatives in St. Petersburg, to hold an international peace conference. 26 Several influences had been at work on the Tsar, including Ivan (Jean de) Bloch (1836 Bloch ( -1902 , a Polish banker, 27 Bertha von Suttner (1843 Suttner ( -1914 28 and the InterParliamentary Union (IPU). 29
The First Hague Peace Conference
In 1899 Japan, together with some two dozen mostly European nations, but among them the USA, China, Persia, Siam and Turkey, participated in the 'first truly international assembl[y] meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress' (Hinsley, 1963: 139) . As we have seen, Japan had been receptive to the idea of the Law of Nations, but took a turn with Fukuzawa Yukichi and the Iwakura mission to adopt a more realistic foreign and military posture, following Western patterns. This did not mean, however, that in Japan the idea of the Law of Nations and an international order based on the rule of law had become discredited.
On 25 August 1898, Motono Ichirô (1862-1918), the Japanese minister in Brussels, sent a cable to prime minister Ôkuma Shigenobu (1838 Shigenobu ( -1922 in Tokyo, informing him about a 'note' (circular letter) from Russian foreign minister Count Muraviev:
Main reasons laid down in the note are as follows: During the last twenty years, the maintenance of peace has been considered as the object of international policy; and under the pretext of the maintenance of peace, Great Powers have formed alliances, increased and still are increasing their armaments without success: Financial burdens, resulting from it increase day by day, and injure public prosperity. . . . If this situation continues, it will . . . lead to catastrophe. 30 , the 'father of Japanese socialism', dedicated several issues of the Unitarian journal Rikugô Zasshi to Bloch's work (Powles, 1978: 156) , and in 1904 a full translation was published in Japanese under the title Kinji no Sensô to Keizai (Modern War and Economy) by 'a publisher called Min Yu Sha (Friends of Democratisation)' (Tsuboi, 1999: 159) . For the most thorough investigation into Bloch's contribution to bring about the Hague peace conferences, see van den Dungen (1983 (Beales, 1931: 231) . 29 The IPU was a worldwide association of parliamentarians, founded in 1889. Japan became a fully fledged IPU member in 1910, after having been an active participant for some time (Uhlig, 1988) . 30 Gaikô shiryôkan (Diplomatic Record Office), MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I. The first circular was issued on 12/24 August 1898.
Muraviev, Motono wrote, 'added that he does not think that such a conference may produce immediate result, but he hopes that it may serve to prepare solutions for the future' (MT 2.4.1.2., vol. I).
When press and politicians in Europe reacted favourably at first, '[t] hroughout the world the Peace Movement seized its opportunity. . . . Petitions to Governments were opened all over Europe' (Beales, 1931: 231) .
Hayashi Tadasu ( , the minister in St. Petersburg, wired on 1 September to Ôkuma, that at a meeting on the previous day the German secretary of state in the foreign ministry, Bernhard von Bülow, had 'confidentially informed' him that the 'German Government was disposed to take into favourable consideration the proposal of the emperor of Russia'. On the same day, Motono sent an almost euphoric cable: 'it appears that European press welcomes Russian proposal with almost unanimity, and considers it as one of the most important acts of international policy of this century.' 31 Also, on 1 September, Motono communicated to Ôkuma the following story about the Tsar's initiative: there are two versions about the probable cause of the Russian proposal: (1) On 13 September, Ôkuma sent Hayashi the reply of the Japanese government, 'to accept the proposition of the Imperial Government of Russia and to participate'. 33 A second Manifesto, circulated by the Russian government on 30 December 1898/11 January 1899, toned down the original intent, 'compl[ying] more neatly with the wishes of the foreign governments' (van den Dungen, 1983: 16-17) . On 12 January of the following year, Hayashi communicated to foreign minister Aoki Shûzô 34 in Tokyo details of the Russian disarmament proposals, concerning the 'freezing' of armaments (point 1), and including the prohibition of new weapons more dangerous than those already existing (point 2) and production of submarines (point 4). 35 On 18 The documents in the foreign ministry's archive in Tokyo, among entries at the beginning of the year 1899, contain a copy of Leo Tolstoy's famous 'Letter to the Swedes' of 23 January 1899 (followed by a Japanese translation), from which it may be worth quoting here, as it is known that thoughtful Japanese politicians would have been affected by his views. 37 Armies will disappear when public opinion brands with contempt those who, whether for advantage or from fear, sell their dignity as men and enter the ranks of those murderers dressed in fools' clothes -called the army, when men will be ashamed to wear, as they now do, implements of murder, and when the word 'military' will be, what indeed it is -a term of foul abuse. Only then will armies first diminish and then quite disappear, and a new era in the life of humanity will commence. 38 On 12 April, Hayashi Tadasu was appointed chief delegate to the conference. 39 The Japanese government was well aware of the ambivalence and widespread scepticism in the European capitals. 40 The instructions stated unmistakably: 'Europe is the center of military and naval activity and it is chiefly to deal with the situation there that the Conference is convoked.' 41 At the conference, which continued from 18 May to 29 July, 96 delegates from 26 countries worked in three committees: one on Armaments, under M. Beernaert of Belgium; one on the Laws of War, under the Russian jurist Feodor de Martens; and one on Arbitration and Conciliation, under Leon Bourgeois (a member of the French Inter-Parliamentary Group) (Brown Scott, 1909; Holls 1900; De Armend Davis, 1962; Dülffer, 1981) .
The most important and far-reaching project at the conference, besides disarmament, was the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, in Japanese jôsetsu kokusai chûsai saibanshô), a parent of today's International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. This no doubt went to the heart of the sovereign right of nations to wage war (jus ad bellum). The Russian project for a 'Convention on Mediation and Arbitration' comprised two areas in which the appeal to the Court was to be obligatory, namely, all questions of a 'purely technical' nature: 'First, question of pecuniary indemnity so far as not to touch [ 
36 According to van den Dungen (1983: 28) , ' the Germans had been opposed to the Conference from the start, seeing in it only a Franco-Russian maneuver to deceive them'. 37 However, Tolstoy, the 'Christian anarchist' and 'militant pacifist', was not much in favour of the Hague Peace Conference, as expressed in the same letter: 'the conference itself can be nothing but one of those hypocritical arrangements, which, far from tending towards peace and the diminution of the evils of militarism, on the contrary, serve to hide those evils from men, by proposing evidently fallacious means of escape, and thus turning the eyes from the one safe path'. The 'easiest and surest way to universal disarmament', according to Tolstoy, was 'by individuals refusing to take part in military service . . . this is the only way to escape from the ever-increasing miseries of wardom (militarism)' (emphasis added); see van den Dungen (1983: 21-22 In fact, Japan had first concluded an arbitration treaty with Peru in 1873 (13/25 June), and was familiar with the idea. Like in most European and Western countries, there was also public support in Japan for the conferences, as is shown by a Japanese princess who forwarded 6,471 signatures 'to the promoters of the Association in Germany', on behalf of the Japanese 'Ladies International Peace Association', to back the peace conference. 47 The US delegate, Frederick Holls, relates how the Japanese set about sending the text of the Arbitration Treaty to Tokyo, which 'involved cabling the entire text . . . the cost of the cablegram . . . being 35,000 francs', an incident which may 'illustrate the completeness with which the great and enterprising Empire of the Far East entered into judicial relations with the rest of the civilized world' (Holls, 1900: 325) .
However, the desired unanimity to make international arbitration compulsory in certain areas of potential conflict did not come about, as the German Reich declined to make any binding commitments, followed by Austria-Hungary among the big powers. 'The essence of the whole conference and the prime objective of the peace movement itself were thereby destroyed' (van den Dungen, referring to Ivan Bloch 's view, 1983: 33; see Brown Scott, 1909 and Brown Scott, 1917: 314ff. for details). Germany prided itself nonetheless in having contributed substantially to the laws of war (jus in bello). 48 By 31 December, all the powers had signed the final document. On 6 October 1900, Japan deposited its signatures on the Conventions and Declarations at The Hague, and on 10 February 1901 the ratification documents were exchanged. For the list of 'peace judges', Motono Ichirô and foreign office adviser Henry Willard Denison (1846 Denison ( -1914 49 were nominated. Though it was 'surely extraordinary' (Saito, 1935: 198) and a special honour for Denison, the fact that a foreigner was employed in the Japanese service was accepted practice at the time, other Asian countries followed, too.
In spite of considerable disappointment about the results of the conference among the international peace movement, hopes were high that the concert of nations had begun to experience 'a profound change with regards to its legal structure. A new age of a "world federal union" (Weltstaatenbund) had (Schücking, 1918: 70) . 49 Henry Willard Denison came to Japan in 1869 to serve with the US consulate in Kanagawa. Having started his own law practice in 1878, he then served from 1880 until his death as legal adviser (hôritsu kômon) to the foreign ministry in Tokyo. MT 2.4.1.3., vol. I (Saito, 1935: 179-189). dawned' (Schücking, 1918: 69) . The participating nations agreed to hold a second conference to seek a solution to the unresolved problems which had remained.
Between the Conferences
At the beginning of the century, in Japan, a Christian-socialist movement influenced by pacifist ideals flourished, as evidenced by thinkers like Uchimura Kanzô (1861 Kanzô ( -1930 , whose articles were published in the Yorozu Chôhô, a newspaper having around 1903 a circulation of 150,000 copies, and of which Uchimura was editor (see Howes, 1978) . At that time, the impending war with Russia was casting its shadow, a conflict that might have been prevented, had the results of the First Peace Conference been more tangible. Advocates of war against Russia and pacifists clashed repeatedly and publicly over how best to defend Japan's interests.
Meanwhile, the project of obligatory arbitration, which had been desired by the large majority of nations at the conference in 1899, was pursued bilaterally and materialized in numerous treaties (2 in 1903 , 27 in 1904 , 48 in 1905 , 49 in 1906 see Uhlig, 1988: 837) . In France, prominent politicians like Pierre Marie Waldeck-Rousseau and Jean Jaurès together with Baron d'Estournelles de Constant formed a 'groupe d'arbitrage' (Dülffer, 1981: 261) , which successfully lobbied for the idea of a judicial treatment of international conflicts, in place of the traditional instruments of war. Also, in 1902 Baron d'Estournelles de Constant took steps toward 'the summoning of the second Hague Conference', having in the same year 'prevailed on President Roosevelt to submit to the Court a minor pecuniary dispute between the United States and Mexico' (Beales, 1931: 262-3; Dülffer, 1981: 216-7; Wild, 1973: 99f.) , which was followed by other countries employing the Court's services. Perhaps 'the American decision actually saved the Court' (Wild, 1973: 101 53 On 21 October 1904, the US president sent a nine-page circular letter to the foreign representatives of the countries who had participated in the first conference, proposing a second peace conference, stating inter alia: enlightened public opinion and modern civilization alike demand that differences between nations should be adjudicated and settled in the same manner as disputes between individuals are adjudicated, namely, Komura, 9 December 1904, MT 2.4.1.7., vol. I. 59 Katsura was war minister (1898-1900) and prime minister (1901-06, 1908-11 and 1912-13) . A 'hardliner', in 1902 he concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which Germany had also been invited to join, and was impressed by German 'Kultur', having co-founded the 'Society for German Science' (Doitsu gaku kyôkai) in 1882, together with Katô Hiroyuki, first president of Tokyo University and 'leading Japanese advocate of Social Darwinism' (Wippich, 1993: 60-61 65 Apparently, however, the 'attempt of various Governments, particularly the English and Russian Governments, to have the question of the limitation of armaments discussed at the Second Hague Conference failed as a result of the opposition of Germany' (Wehberg, 1921: 31 On 1 May 1907, Inoue Katsunosuke reported to foreign minister Hayashi the contents of a debate in the German Reichstag of 30 April. German chancellor von Bülow had replied to a question of whether it was 'expedient' to include the problem of the limitation of armaments: 'At the First Conference the only decision arrived at was that Powers should carefully examine the question.
Klaus Schlichtmann T H E H A G U E PEACE C O N F E R E N C
[The] German Government had done so but had found no means which in view of the great difficulties in the geographical, economical, military and political situation of the different States would be justifiable and suitable to remove these differences and to serve as a basis for an 67 Obviously, Denison as an 'actor in the Japanese camp' had to follow Japanese orders -mostly in close cooperation with the chief of intelligence in the foreign ministry's telegraphic department, Shidehara Kijûrô, who was the main link between the delegation at The Hague and the Japanese government. Naturally, Denison was also expected to advise the Japanese government and the foreign ministry on what course of action should be taken, and in this capacity again, Shidehara as his immediate superior would have been the addressee for any discussion on the relevant issues. 
The Second Peace Conference
The conference convened from 15 June to 18 October under the Presidency of the Russian ambassador in Paris, M. de Nelidov. This time some 256 delegates representing 44 'civilized nations' participated, including some from Latin America. By far the most important question on the agenda was the 'general obligatorium' (Zorn, 1920: 67) , i.e. binding agreements to accept legal procedure to settle international disputes.
An event at the end of June 'caused much sensation to Japanese authorities', when three Koreans suddenly appeared at The Hague, having been sent by the Korean emperor Kojong, with credentials, and carrying his seal. 76 These delegates, Yi Sangsol (Yi-Sang-Sul 77 ), 78 Yi Chun (Yj-Tjoune) 79 and Yi Ui-jong (Yi-Oui-Tjyong), 80 on 27 June presented a printed note to the delegations, requesting an intervention on behalf of the empire of Korea, and accusing Japan: 'Can we, as an independent nation, allow Japanese deception to destroy the friendly diplomatic relations that existed until now between us and the other nations, becoming a constant threat to the peace in the Far East?' 81 On 5 July, however, the New York Herald reported Kojong had 'repudiate[d] the mission and denounce[d] the credentials as forgery' 82 -according to some sources under threat from the resident Japanese.
On 7 July, foreign minister Hayashi journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003 396 73 MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III. Already in 1899, Emperor William II had given his opinion: 'In order not to make the Tsar look foolish before the Europeans, I agree to this nonsense! But will in actual practice afterwards only rely and call on God and my sharp sword! I don't give a damn for the agreements!' (Dülffer, 1981: 93) . 74 MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III. 75 Inoue to Hayashi, 02.06.07. MT 2.4.1.7., vol. III. There is also the following report of a half-hour conversation, which Tsudzuki had with the German Emperor: 'the Emperor had a long talk with me lasting about thirty minutes. The general trend of which made me feel that he was trying to impress upon me [the] possibility and the desirability as well of the close friendship and the intimate understanding between the two nations which based their greatness on the strength of their self-defence as of the strong sympathy between the two heroic peoples animated so thoroughly by military spirit and so willing to fulfil their duties towards the respective bodies politic. . . . it was something more than an ordinary after-dinner conversation.' 
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83 Ito Hirobumi was a leading statesman whose moderate views sometimes brought him in conflict with the military clique. Storry (1960: 144) Nonetheless, the chief delegate and speaker of the Japanese delegation at the conference, Tsudzuki Keiroku, represented his country 'with admirable tact and dignity, using as occasion required, French or English with equal facility and telling effect' (Brown Scott, 1909: 160) . On 27 June, Tsudzuki wired to Tokyo: 'Russian delegation has proposed, under a skilfully veiled form, a quasi obligatory enquete internationale. German[y] will of course oppose it.' 88 Understandably, the Japanese response to Germany's lack of cooperation in the project at The Hague was one of caution and restraint; a Japanese positive vote on the issue of obligatory arbitration required unanimity among the powers. Japan was reluctant to take sides in a dispute that was in its perception (mainly) a European problem.
The Russians evidently continued to maintain an active interest in the juridic progress of the 'Work of The Hague', probably due to the eminent jurist Feodor de Martens, who had been among the chief Russian delegates at the first conference, and favoured the arbitration project.
It was not yet decided what the position of Great Britain with regards to obligatory arbitration would be, but it also voted for the 'Obligatorium' (Zorn, 1920: 71-72 (Wild, 1973: 309) . Under the circumstances, perhaps, there was hardly any choice for Japan. The chance to act differently came briefly when, after the First World War, Shidehara Kijûrô (1872-1951) became foreign minister. 90 Eventually, the great majority of states voted in favour of the principle of obligatory arbitration; it was turned down only by Germany 91 and Austria-Hungary, who were joined by Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Rumania, Switzerland and Turkey (Zorn, 1920: 72) . Nevertheless, the peace conference unanimously recognized obligatory arbitration as a guiding principle for the future (Brown Scott, 1916: 130) . 92 On 20 September, Tsudzuki cabled to . 91 Consequently, after the conference, the German government also declined 'to negotiate with the United States a treaty of General Arbitration . . . and in . . . 1914, to conclude with the United States one of a series of treaties for the advancement of peace by agreeing to submit disputes of all kinds to the investigation and report of a Commission of Inquiry' (Brown Scott, 1917: 314) . 92 Tsudzuki to Hayashi, 12 October 1907, the first point: 'The Commission is unanimous . . . in recognizing the principle of obligatory arbitration'. MT 2.4.1.7., vol. IV.
Hayashi that a third peace conference was planned for May 1914, 93 with Japan as one of nine members in the advisory committee preparing for the convention. Experts preparing for the third conference now began working to replace the principle of unanimity adopted at the second conference by majority voting procedures, to outvote Germany and the countries that had followed its lead, on the question of the binding nature of the court (Schücking, 1912: 149-271) .
After the conference, Tsudzuki travelled through Germany to England, where he met British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey. 94 In June the following year, the foreign ministry made public that 'the Imperial Government are prepared to give their consent to twelve of the thirteen Conventions. They do not, for the present, intend to sign the Convention relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court and they have decided to withhold their agreement to the Declaration prohibiting the discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons. As to this latter Act it may be mentioned that complete unanimity among the great Powers is lacking.' 95
Conclusion
The great significance of the Hague conferences is that the participation of Japan and other extra-European powers created a new 'concert of nations'. This was occasion not only for far-reaching hopes, but also irrational fears, including the fear of losing future prospects as a colonial power, as in the case of Germany, and to some extent also Japan. The characteristic features of this development were -in positive terms -a new internationalism (universal participation of states based on the principle of equality) and pacifism (disarmament and the pacific settlement of international disputes through due process of law instead of war). Japan was, in principle, in favour of such overall regulation. The discord and rivalry among the powers prevented it for the time being -and also subsequently to a great extent -from clearly articulating its preferences. The formula negotiated at the Conference, however -disarmament and 'arbitration' -had, as the history of its successor organizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations show, not become invalid, and remains a viable option.
The special policy of Japan towards the conferences consisted in its basic disposition and active policy to cooperate with the 'West', in spite of the fact that there had been much criticism of Western attitudes, including Western disregard for international law, and violation of Asian interests. Yet, Japanese intellectuals and politicians recognized and sometimes even had a glowing admiration for Western intellectual and scientific accomplishments. A chance was missed to bind Japan into a mandatory international order, and become a pillar of peace in the region. 96 This shows that the realists' contention that an international legal order to ensure peace and justice was not feasible because of the non-Western countries' lack of a comparable (and compatible) legal tradition and willingness to submit to such order, is misguided.
As to Germany, it succeeded in striking a deadly blow at the project of obligatory arbitration favoured by the great majority of
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the participants, and eventually upset the balance of power Japan could have strengthened decisively and on a global scale. Without the latter, the reduction of armaments also could not proceed. After the First World War, Philipp Zorn, professor of international law at the university of Königsberg, who had participated in both conferences, concluded:
The . . . great task was the successful institution of the obligatorium. With impatient longing the world awaited its accomplishment. And that Germany did not recognize this world expectation, and even believed it had to repudiate it, was its prime and tragic mistake . . . (Zorn, 1920: 75) an immense political miscalculation . . . which must have provoked and [in fact] had the most serious consequences, yea, which today, in the horrible light of the universal conflagration of 1914-18 appears as a cause for the world war. (Zorn, 1920: 57) 
